INDONESIA - 30th September Massacre: Self-criticism of the PKI

With regards to the 55th anniversary of the mass murder of Indonesian communists named “G30S” by the reaction, we want to publish the document: “SELF-CRITICISM BY THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY”.

On september 30th, 1965, the all-out crackdown and mass-murder of leaders, cadres and sympathizers of the PKI, as well as friends and family members began. Up to a million were murdered in the most barbarian massacre, that reduced the 3rd largest communist party in the world to shreds and allowed Suharto to establish a fascist dictatorship. Suharto’s coup and the reign of terror that followed, were in the interest and with active support of US-imperialism, as well as Australian and British imperialism.


The document was written in 1966, only one year after the massacre, and published in the People’s Republic of China (as part of a pamphlet). Sudisman, Politbureau member of the PKI and co-author of the document, was arrested himself in 1966, put through a slow trial and executed in 1968. While it certainly has it’s limitations, it gives a great example because of the speed of its publication, and the clarity, in that, while the masses were waging heroic resistance against the attack, it was the parties anti-proletarian policy, stemming from modern revisionism that made this massacre happen. Therefore, while condemning the attack, it shows unbreakable optimism that in the end, revolution will prevail.


The self-criticism emphatically points out that the experience of the struggle waged by the party in the past has shown how indispensable it is for the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists, who are resolved to defend Marxism-Leninism and to combat modern revisionism, to study not only the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, but also to devote special attention to studying the Though of Mao Tse-tung who has succeeded in brilliantly inheriting, defending and developing Marxism-Leninism to its peak in the present era.”

Maoism is the third, highest and last stage of the proletarian ideology and it was systematized by Chairman Gonzalo. The application of the great truth of Maoism on the Indonesian reality will with no doubt be a sharp weapon in the hands of the Indonesian people and their vanguard in applying Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to forward the Indonesian revolution.









SELF-CRITICISM BY THE POLITICAL BUREAU

OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE

INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY


(Ercerpts)


September 1966

lndonesian Tribune published in its January issue (No.

3) the self-criticism adopted by the Political Bureau of the

Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party

(P.K.I.) in Septemb,er 1966. The self-criticism is entitled

"Build the P.K.I. Along the Marxist-Leninist Line to

Lead the People's Democratic Revolution in Indonesia".

The self-criticism says that the disaster which has

caused such serious Iosses to the P.K.I. and the revolu-

tionary movement of the Indonesian people after the out-

break and the defeat of the September 30th Movement has

lifted up the curtain which for a long period has hidden

the grave weaknesses of the P.K.I.

The Political Bureau is aware that it has the greatest

responsibility with regard to the grave weaknesses and

mistakes of the Party during the period under review.

Therefore, the Political Bureau is giving serious atten-

tion to and highly appreciates aII criticisms from cadres

and members of the Party given in a Marxist-Leninist

spirit, as well as honest criticism from Party sympathiz-

ers that have been expressed in different ways. The

Political Bureau is resolved to make self-criticism in a

Marxist-Leninist way, putting into practice the teaching

of Lenin and the example of Comrade Musso in unfold-

ing Marxist-Leninist criticism and self-criticism.

The self-criticism says that under the situation where

the most vicious and cruel white terror is being unleashed

by the military dictatorship of the Right-wing army

generals Nasution and Suharto, it is not easy to make

as complete criticism and self-criticism as possible. To

meet the urgent necessity, it is necessary to point out

the main issues in the ideological, political and organiza-

tional fields, in order to facilitate the study of the weak-

nesses and mistakes of the Party during the current

rectification movement.

With all modesty and sincerity the Political Bureau

presents this self-criticism. The Political Bureau ex-

pects all members to take an active part in the discus-

sions of the weaknesses and mistakes of the Party lead-

ership, critically analyse them, and do their utmost to

improve this self-criticism of the Political Bureau by

drawing lessons from their respective experiences, col-

lectively or individually. The Political Bureau expects

all members to take firm hold of the principle: "unity

- criticism - untiy and "learning from past mistakes to

avoid future ones, and curing the sickness to save the

patient, in order to achieve the twofold objective of

clarity in ideology and unity among comrades". The

Political Bureau is convinced that, by holding firmly to

this correct principle, every Party member will take part

in the movement to study and surmount these weak-

nesses and mistakes with the determination to rebuild

the P.K.I. along the Marxist-Leninist line, to strengthen

communist unity and solidarity, to raise the ideological,

political and organizational vigilance, and to heighten

the fighting spirit in order to win victory.

THE MAIN WEAKNESSES IN THE

IDEOLOGICAL FIELD

The serious weaknesses and mistakes of the Party in

the period after 1951, the self-criticism says, certainly

had as their source the weaknesses in ideological field,

too, especially among the Party leadership. Instead of

integrating revolutionary theories with the concrete prac-

tice of the Indonesian revolution, the Party leadership

adopted the road which was divorced from the guidance

of the most advanced theories. This experience shows

that the P.K.I. had not succeeded as yet in establishing

a core of leadership that was composed of proletarian

elements, which really had the most correct understand-

ing of Marxism-Leninism, systematic and not fragmen-

tary, practical and not abstract understanding.

During the period after 1951, subjectivism continued

to grow, gradually became greater and greater and gave

rise to Right opportunism that merged with the influence

of modern revisionism in the international communist

movement. This was the black line of Right opportunism

which became the main feature of the mistakes committed

by the P.K.I. in this period. The rise and the develop-

ment of these weaknesses and errors were caused by the

following factors:

First, the tradition of criticism and self-criticism in

a Marxist-Leninist way was not developed in the Party,

especially among the Party leadership.

The rectification and study movements which from

time to time were organized in the Party were not carried

out seriously and persistently, their results were not sum-

med up in a good manner, and they were not followed

by the appropriate measures in the organizational field.

Study movements were aimed more at the rank and file,

and never at unfolding criticism and self-criticism among

the leadership. Criticism from below far from being care-

fully listened to, was even suppressed.

Second, the penetration of the bourgeois ideology along

two channels, through contacts with the national bour-

geoisie when the Party established a united front with

them, and through the bourgeoisification of Party cadres,

especially the leadership, after the Party obtained cer-

tain positions in governmental and semi-governmental

institutions. The increasing number of Party cadres who

occupied certain position,s in governrnental and semi-

governmental institutions, in the centre and in the re-

gions, created "the rank of bourgeoisified workers" and

this constituted "the real channels for reformism". Such

a situation did not exist before the August Revolution

of 1945.

Third, modern revisionism began to penetrate into our

Party when the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central

Committee of the Fifth Congress uncritically approved

a report which supported the lines of the 20th Congress

of the C.P.S.U., and adopted the line of "achieving so-

cialism peacefully through parliamentary means" as the

Iine of the P.K.I. This "peaceful road", one of the char-

acteristics of modern revisionism, was further reaffirmed

in the Sixth National Congress of the P.K.I. which ap-

proved the following passage in the Party Constitution:

"There is a possibility that a peoptre's democratic system

as a transitional stage to socialism in Indonesia can be

achieved by peaceful means, in parliamentary way. The

P.K.I. persistently strives to transform this possibility

into a reaIity." This revisionist line was further empha-

sized in the Seventh National Congress of the P.K.I. and

was never corrected, not even when our Party was al-

ready aware that since the 20th Congress of the C'P.S.U.,

the leadership of the C.P.S.U. had been following the

road of modern revisionism.

The self-criticism stresses that the experience of the

P.K.I. provides the lesson that by criticizing the modern

revisionism of the C.P.S.U. leadership alone, it does not

mean that the P.K.I. itself will automatically be free

from errors of Right opportunism, the same as what the

modern revisionists are doing. The experience of the

P.K.I. provides the lesson that modern revisionism, the

greatest danger in the international communist move-

ment, is also the greatest danger for the P.K.I. For the

P.K.I., modern revisionism is not "a latent but not an

acute danger", but a concrete danger that has brought

great damage to the Party and serious losses for the rev-

olutionary movement of the Indonesian people. There-

fore, we must not in any way underestimate the danger

of modern revisionism and must wage a resolute and

ruthless struggle against it. The firm stand against

modern revisionism in all fields can be effectively main-

tained only when our Party abandons the line of "preserv-

ing friendship with the modern revisionists".

It is a fact that the P.K.I., while criticizing the modern

revisionism of the C.P.S.U. leadership, also made revi-

sionist mistakes itself, because it had revised Marxist-

Leninist teachings on class struggle, state and revolution.

Furthermore, the P.K.I. leadership not only did not wage

a struggle in the theoretical field against other "revolu-

tionary" political thoughts which could mislead the pro-

letariat, as Lenin has taught us to do, but had voluntarily

given concessions in the theoretical field. The P.K.I.

leadership maintained that there was an identity between

the three components of Marxism: materialist philosophy,

political economy and scientific socialism, and the so-

called "three components of Sukarno's teachings". They

wanted to make Marxism, which is the ideology of the

working class, the property of the whole nation which

includes the exploiting classes hostile to the working class.

THE MAIN ERORS IN THE POLITICAL FIELD


The self-criticism says that the mistakes of Right op-

portunism in the political field which are now under

discussion include three problems: (1) the road to people's

democracy in Indonesia, (2) the question of state power,

and (3) the implementation of the policy of the national

united front.

One of the fundamental differences and problems of

disputes between Marxism-Leninism and modern revi-

sionism lies precisely in the problem of choosing the road

to socialism. Marxism-Leninism teaches that socialism

can only be achieved through the road of proletarian

revolution and that in the case of colonial or semi-colonial

and semi-feudal countries like Indonesia, socialism can

only be achieved by first completing the stage of the

people's democratic revolution. On the contrary, revi-

sionism dreams of achieving socialism through the

"peaceful road".

During the initial years of this period since 1951, our

Party had achieved certain results in the political struggle

as well as in the building of the Party. One important

achievement of this period was the formulation of the

main problems of the Indonesian revolution. It was

formulated that the present stage of the Indonesian rev-

olution was a new-type bourgeois democratic revolution,

whose tasks were to liquidate imperialism and the vestiges

of feudalism and to establish a people's democratic sys-

tem as a transitional stage to socialism. The driving

forces of the revolution were the working class, the peas-

antry and the petty bourgeoisie; the leading force of

the revolution was the working class and the principal

mass strength of the revolution was the peasantry. It

was also formulated that the national bourgeoisie was a

wavering force of the revolution who might side with

the revolution to certain limits and at certain periods

but who, at other times, might betray the revolution.

The Party furthermore formulated that the working class,

in order to fulfill its obligation as the leader of the rev-

olution, must forge a revolutionary united front with

other revolutionary classes and groups based on worker-

peasant alliance and under the leadership of the working

class.

However, there was a very important shortcoming

which in later days developed into Right opportunism

or revisionism, namely, that the Party had not yet come

to the clearest unity of minds on the principal means and

the main form of struggle of the Indonesian revolution.

The Chinese revolution, the self-criticism says, has

provided the lesson concerning the main form of struggle

of the revolution in colonial oi semi-colonial and semi-

feudal countries, namely, the people's armed struggle

against the armed counter-revolution. In line with the

essence of the revolution as an agrarian revolution, then

the essence of the people's armed struggle is the armed

struggle of the peasants in an agrarian revolution under

the leadership of the working class. The practice of the

Chinese revolution is first and foremost the application

of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of China.

At the same time, it has laid down the general law for

the revolutions of the peoples in colonial or semi-colonial

and semi-feudal countries.

To achieve its complete victory, it stresses, the Indo-

nesian revolution must also follow the road of the Chinese

revolution. This means that the Indonesian revolution

must inevitably adopt this main form of struggle, namely,

the people's armed struggle against the armed counter-

revolution which, in essence, is the armed agrarian rev-

olution of the peasants under the leadership of the

proletariat.

All forms of legal and parliamentary work should serve

the principal means and the main form of struggle, and

must not in any way impede the process of the ripening

of armed struggle.

The experience during the last fifteen years has taught

us that starting from not explicitly denying the "peaceful

road" and not firmly holding to the general law of rev-

olution in colonial or semi-colonial and semi-feudal coun-

tries, the P.K.I. gradually got bogged down in parliamen-

tary and other forms of legal struggle. The Party leader-

ship even considered this to be the main form of struggle

to achieve the strategic aim of the Indonesian revolution.

The legality of the Party was not considered as one

method of struggle at a given time and under certain

conditions, but was rather regarded as a principle, while

other forms of struggle should serve this principle. Even

when counter-revolution not only has trampled underfoot

the legality of the Party, but has violated the basic human

rights of the Cornmunists as well, the Party leadership

still tried to defend. this "legality" with all their might.

The "peaceful road" was firmly established in the

Party when the Fourth Plenary Session of the 'Central

Committee of the Fifth Congress in 1956 adopted a docu-

ment which approved the modern revisionist line of the

20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. In such a situation, when

the revisionist line was already firmly established in the

Party, it was impossible to have a correct Marxist-Leninist

Iine of strategy and tactics. The formulation of the main

lines of strategy and tactics of the Party started from

a vacillation between the "peaceful road" and the "road

of armed revolution", in the process of which the "peace-

ful road" finally became dominant.

Under such conditions, the General Line of the P.K.I.

was formulated by the Sixth National Congress (1959).

It reads, "To continue the forging of the national united

front, and to continue the building of the Party, so as

to accomplish the demands of the August Revolution of

1945." Based on the General Line of the Party, the slogan

"Raise the Three Banners of the Party" was decided.

These were: (1) the banner of the national united front,

(2) the banner of the building of the Party, and (3) the

banner of the 1945 August Revolution. The General Line

was meant as the road to people's democracy in

Indonesia.

The Party leadership tried to explain that the three

Banners of the Party were the three main weapons to

win the people's democratic revolution which, as Comrade

Mao Tse-tung has said, were "a well-disciplined Party

armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, using the

method of self-criticism and linked with the masses of

the people; an army under the leadership of such a Party;

a united front off all revolutionary classes and all revolu-

tionary groups under the leadership of such a Party".

Thus the second main weapon means that there must

be a people's armed struggle against armed counter-

revolution under the leadership of the Party. The Party

leadership tried to replace this with the slogan "Raise

the banner of the 1945 August Revolution".

In order to prove that the road followed was not the

opportunist "peaceful road", the Party leadership always

spoke of the two possibilities, the possibility of a "peace-

ful road" and the possibility of a non-peaceful road.

They held that the better the Party prepared itself to

face the possibility of a non-peaceful road, the greater

would be the possibility for a "peaceful road". By doing

so the Party leadership cultivated in the minds of Party

members, the working class and the masses of the work-

ing people the hope for a peaceful road which in reality

did not exist.

In practice, the Party leadership did not prepare the

whole ranks of the Party, the working class and the

masses of the people to face the possibility of a non-

peaceful road. The most striking proof of it was the

grave tragedy which happened after the outbreak and

the failure of the September 30th Movement. Within

a very short space of time, the counter-revolution suc-

ceeded in massacring and arresting hundreds of thou-

sands of Communists and non-communist revolutionaries

who found themselves in a passive position, paralyzing

the organization of the P.K.I. and the revolutionary mass

organizations. Such a situation surely would never hap-

pen if the Party leadership did not deviate from the

revolutionary road.

The Party leadership declared, says the self-criticism,

that "our Party must not copy the theory of armed strug-

gle abroad, but must carry out the Method of Combining

the Three Forms of Struggle: guerrilla warfare in the

countryside (especially by farm labourers and poor peas-

ants), revolutionary actions by the workers (especially

transport workers) in the cities, and intensive work among

the enemy's armed forces". The Party leadership criti-

cized some comrades who, in studying the experience of

the armed struggle of the Chinese people, were consider-

ed seeing only its similarities with the conditions in

Indonesia. On the contrary, the Party leadership put for-

ward several allegedly different conditions that must be

taken into account, until they arrived at the conclusion

that the method typical to the Indonesian revolution was

the "Method of Combining the Three Forms of Struggle".

To fulfill its heavy but great and noble historical mis-

sion, to lead the people's revolution against imperialism,

feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, the Indonesian

Marxist-Leninists must firmly reject the revisionist

"peaceful road", reject the "theory of the Method of

Combining the Three Forms of Struggle", and hold aloft

the banner of armed people's revolution. Following the

example of the glorious Chinese revolution, the Indone-

sian Marxist-Leninists must establish revolutionary base

areas; they must "turn the backward villages into ad-

vanced, consolidated base areas, into great military, polit-

ical, economic and cultural bastions of the revolution".

While working for the realization of this most principal

question we must also carry out other forms of struggle;

armed struggle will never advance without being co-

ordinated with other forms of struggle.

The line of Right opportunism followed by the Party

leadership was also reflected in their attitude with regard

to the state, in particular to the state of the Republic

of Indonesia, the self-criticism says.

Based on this Marxist-Leninist teaching on state, the

task of the P.K.I., after the August Revolution of 1945

failed, should have been the education of the Indonesian

working class and the rest of the working people, so as

to make them understand as clearly as possible the class

nature of the state of the Republic of Indonesia as a

bourgeois dictatorship. The P.K.I. should have aroused

the consciousness of the working class and the working

people that their struggle for liberation would inevitably

lead to the necessity of "superseding the bourgeois state"

by the people's state under the leadership of the work-

ing class, through a "violent revolution". But the P.K.I.

leadership took the opportunist line that gave rise to the

illusion among the people about bourgeois democracy.

The self-criticism says that the climax of the deviation

from Marxist-Leninist teaching on state committed by

the Party leadership was the formulation of the "theory

of the two aspects in the state power of the Republic of

Indonesia".

The "two-aspect theory" viewed the state and the

state power in the following way:

The state power of the Republic, viewed as contra-

diction, is a contradiction between two opposing aspects.

This first aspect is the aspect which represents the

interests of the people (manifested by the progressive

stands and policies of President Sukarno that are sup-

ported by the P.K.I. and other groups of the people).

The second aspect is the aspect that represents the

enemies of the people (manifested by the stands and

policies of the Right-wing forces and die-hards). The

people's aspect has now become the main aspect and

takes the leading role in the state power of the Republic.

The "two-aspect theory" obviously is an opportunist

or revisionist deviation, because it denies the Marxist-

Leninist teaching that "the state is an organ of the rule

of a definite class which cannot be reconciled with its

antipode (the class opposite to it)”. It is unthinkable that

the Republic of Indonesia can be jointly ruled by the

people and the enemies of the people.

The self-criticism says that the party leadership who

wallowed in the mire of opportunism claimed that the

"people's aspect" had become the main aspect and taken

the hegemony in the state power of the Republic. It was

as if the Indonesian people were nearing the birth of a

people's power. And since they considered that the forces

of the national bourgeoisie in the state power really con-

stituted the "people's aspect", the Party leadership had

done everything to defend and develop this ,,people’s

aspect". The Party leadership had altogether merged

themselves in the interests of the national bourgeoisie.

By considering the national bourgeoisie the ,,people’s

aspect" in the state power of the Republic, and presi-

dent Sukarno the leader of this aspect, the Party leader-

ship erroneously recognized that the national bourgeoisie

was able to lead the new-type democratic revolution.

This is contrary to historical necessity and historical facts.

The Party leadership declared that the "two-aspect

theory" was completely different from the "theory of

structural reform" of the leadership of the revisionist

Italian Communist Party. However, the fact is, theoreti-

caliy or on the basis of practical realities, there is no

difference between the two "theories". Both have for

their starting point the "peaceful road" to socialism.

Both dream of a gradual change in the internal balance

of forces in the state power. Both reject the road of

revolution and both are revisionist.

The anti-revolutionary "two-aspect theory" glaringly

exposed itself in the statement that "the struggle of the

P.K.I. with regard to the state power is to promote the

pro-people aspect so as to make it bigger and dominant,

and the anti-people force can be driven out from the

state power".

The Party leadership even had a name for this anti-

revolutionary road; they called it the road of "revolution

from above and below". By "revolution from above" they

meant that the P.K.I. "must encourage the state power

to take revolutionary steps aimed at making the desired

changes in the personnel and in the state organs". While

by "revolution from below" they meant that the P.K.I.

"must arouse, organize and mobilize the people to achieve

the same changes". It is indeed an extraordinary phan-

tasy! The Party leadership did not learn from the fact

that the concept of President Sukarno on the formation

of a co-operation cabinet (the old-type government of

national coalition), eight years after its announcement,

had not been realized as yet. There was even no sign

that it would ever be realized, despite the insistent

demands. Let alone a change in the state power!

The self-criticism stresses that to clean itself from the

mire of opportunism, our Party must discard this "theory

of two-aspect in the state power" and re-establish the

Marxist-Leninist teaching on state and revolution.

* * *

The 5th National Congress of the Party in the main

had solved theoretically the problem of the national

united front. It formulated that the worker-peasant

alliance was the basis of the national united front. With

regard to the national bourgeoisie a lesson had been

drawn on the basis of the experience during the August

Revolution that this class had a wavering character. In

a certain situation, the national bourgeoisie took part in

the revolution and sided with the revolution, while in

another situation they followed in the steps of the com-

prador-bourgeoisie to attack the driving forces of the

revolution and betrayed the revolution (as shown by their

activities during the Madiun Provocation and their ap-

proval of the Round Table Conference Agreement).

Based on this wavering character of the national bour-

geoisie, the Party formulated the stand that must be

taken by the P.K.I., namely, to make continuous efforts

to win the national bourgeoisie over to the side of rev-

olution, while guarding against the possibility of its be-

traying the revolution. The P.K.I. must follow the policy

of unity and struggle towards the national bourgeoisie,

the self-criticism says.

Nevertheless, since the ideological weakness of subjec-

tivism in the Party, particularly among the Party leader-

ship, had not yet been eradicated, the Party was dragged

into more and more serious mistakes, to such an extent

that the Party lost its independence in the united front

with the national bourgeoisie. This mistake had led to

the situation in which the Party and the proletariat were

placed as the appendage of the national bourgeoisie.

The self-criticism states that a manifestation of this

loss of independence in the united front with the national

bourgeoisie was the evaluation and the stand of the Party

leadership towards Sukarno. The Party leadership did

not adopt an independent attitude towards Sukarno.

They had always avoided conflicts with Sukarno and, on

the contrary, had greatly over-emphasized the similarities

and the unity between the Party and Sukarno. The public

saw that there was no policy of Sukarno that was not

supported by the P.K.I. The Party leadership went so

far as to accept without any struggle the recognition to

Sukarno as "the great leader of the revolution" and the

leader of the "people's aspect" in the state power of the

Republic. In many articles and speeches, the Party

leaders frequently said that the struggle of the P.K.I.

was based not only on Marxism-Leninism, but also on

"the teachings of Sukarno", that the P.K.I. made such

a rapid progress because it realized Sukarno's idea of

Nasakom unity, etc. Even the concept of the people's

democratic system in Indonesia was said to be in con-

formity with Sukarno's main ideas as expressed in his

speech "The Birth of Pantjasila" on June 1, 1945.

The self-criticism repudiates the erroneous view that

"to implement the Political Manifesto in a consistent

manner is the same as implementing the programme of

the P.K.I."

The statement that consistently implementing the

Political Manifesto meant implementing the programme

of the P.K.I. could only be interpreted that it was not the

programme of the P.K.I. that was accepted by the bour-

geoisie, but that, on the contrary, it was the programme

of the national bourgeoisie which was accepted by the

P.K.I., and was made to replace the programme of the

P.K.I., it points out.

The self-criticism says that the abandonment of prin-

ciple in the united front with the national bourgeoisie had

developed even further in the so-called "General Line

of the Indonesian Revolution" that was formulated as

follows: "With the national united front having the work-

ers and peasants as its pillars, the Nasakom as the core

and the Pantjasila as its ideological basis, to complete

the national democratic revolution in order to advance

towards Indonesian Socialism." This so-called "General

Line of the Indonesian Revolution" had not even the

faintest smell of the revolution. Because, from the three

preconditions to win the revolution, namely, a Strong

Marxist-Leninist Party, a people's armed struggle under

the leadership of the Party, and a united front, only the

united front was retained. Even then, it was not a rev-

olutionary united front, because it was not led by the

working class, nor was it based on the alliance of the

working class and the peasantry under the leadership of

the working class, but on the contrary it was based on

the Nasakom.

The Party leadership said that "the slogan for national

co-operation with the Nasakom as the core will by no

means obscure the class content of the national united

front". This statement is incorrect. The class content

of the Nasakom was the working class, the national bour-

geoisie, and even elements of the compradors, the bureau-

crat-capitalists and the landlords. Obviously, putting the

Nasakom in the core not only meant obscuring the class

content of the national united front, but radically chang-

ing the meaning of the revolutionary national united front

into an alliance of the working class with all other classes

in the country, including the reactionary classes, into

class collaboration.

This error must be corrected. The Party must throw

to the dust-bin the erroneous "General Line of the Indo-

nesian Revolution" and return to the correct conception

of a revolutionary national united front based on the

alliance of the workers and peasants under the leader-

ship of the working class.

The abandonment of principle in the united front with

the national bourgeoisie was also the result of the Party's

inability to make a correct and concrete analysis of the

concrete situation, the self-criticism says.

The self-criticism points out that ever since the failure

of the August Revolution of 1945, except in West lrian,

the imperialists did not hold direct political power in

Indonesia. In Indonesia, political power was in the hands

of compradors and landlords who represented the inter-

ests of imperialism and the vestiges of feudalism. Be-

sides, there was no imperialist aggression in Indonesia

taking place. Under such a situation, provided that the

P.K.I. did not make political mistakes, the contradiction

between the ruling reactionary classes and the people

would develop and sharpen, constituting the main con-

tradiction in Indonesia. The primary task of the Indone-

sian revolution is the overthrow of the rule of the reac-

tionary classes within the country who also represent

the interests of the imperialists, in particular the United

States imperialists. Only by taking this road can the

real liquidation of imperialism and the vestiges of feudal-

ism be realized.

By correcting the mistakes made by the Party in the

united front with the national bourgeoisie it does not

mean that now the Party need not unite with this class.

On the basis of the worker-peasant alliance under the

leadership of the working class, our Party must work

to win the national bourgeois class over to the side of the

revolution.

THE MAIN MISTAKES IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL FIELD


The self-criticism says that the erroneous political line

which dominated the Party was inevitably followed by

an equally erroneous organizational line. The longer and

the more intensive the wrong political line ruled in the

Party, the greater were the mistakes in the organizational

field, and the greater the losses caused by them. Right

opportunism which constituted the wrong political line

of the Party in the period after 1951 had been followed

by another Right deviation in the organizational field,

namely, liberalism and legalism.

The line of liberalism in the organizational field mani-

fested itself in the tendency to make the P.K.I. a party

with as large a membership as possible, a party with a

loose organization, which was called a mass Party.

It says that the mass character of the Party is not

determined above all by the large membership, but pri-

marily by the close ties linking the Party and the masses,

by the Party's political line which defends the interests

of the masses, or in other words by the implementation

of the Party's mass line. And the mass line of the Party

can only be maintained when the prerequisites deter-

mining the Party's role as the advanced detachment are

firmly upheld, when the Party members are made up

of the best elements of the proletariat who are armed

with Marxism-Leninism. Consequently, to build a Marx-

ist-Leninist Party which has a mass character is impossi-

ble without giving primary importance to Marxist-Lenin-

ist education.

The self-criticism points out that during the last few

years, the P.K.I. had carried out a line of Party building

which deviated from the principles of Marxism-Leninism

in the organizational field.

The self-criticism says that this liberal expansion of

Party membership could not be separated from the polit-

ical line of the "peaceful road". The large membership

was intended to increase the influence of the Party in

the united front with the national bourgeoisie. The idea

was to effect the gradual change in the balance of forces

that would make it possible to completely defeat the die-

hard forces, with a Party that was growing bigger and

bigger, in addition to the continued policy of unity with

the national bourgeoisie.

The stress was no longer laid on the education and

the training of Marxist-Leninist cadres to prepare them

for the revolution, for work among the peasants in order

to establish revolutionary bases, but on the education of

intellectuals to serve the needs of the work in the united

front with the national bourgeoisie, and to supply cadres

for the various positions in the state institutions that

were obtained thanks to the co-operation with the na-

tional bourgeoisie. The slogan of "total integration with

the peasants" had become empty talk. What was being

done in practice was to draw cadres from the country-

side to the cities, from the regions to the centre, instead

of sending the best cadres to work in the rural areas.

To raise the prestige of the P.K.I. in the eyes of the

bourgeoisie, and to make it respected as the party of intel-

lectuals, the 4-Year Plan stipulated that all cadres of the

higher ranks must obtain academic education, cadres of

the middle ranks high school education, and cadres of the

lower ranks lower middle school education. For this pur-

pose the Party had set up a great number of academies,

schools and courses. So deep-rooted was the intellectual-

ism gripping the Party leadership that all Party leaders

and prominent figures of the popular movements were

obliged to write four theses in order to obtain the degree

of "Marxist Scientists".

The deeper the Party was plunged into the mire of op-

portunism and revisionism, the greater it lacked organiza-

tional vigilance and the more extensively legalism devel-

oped in the organization. The Party leadership had lost

its class prejudice towards the falsehood of bourgeois

democracy. All the activities of the Party indicated as if

the "peaceful road" was an inevitable certainty. The Party

leadership did not arouse the vigilance of the masses of,

Party members to the danger of attacks by the reaction-

aries who were constantly on the look for the chance to

strike. Due to this legalism in the organizational field,

within a short span of time counter-revolution has suc-

ceeded in paralysing the P.K.I. organizationally.

Liberalism in organization had destroyed the principle

of internal democracy in the Party, destroyed collective

leadership and had given rise to personal leadership and

personal rule, to autonomism.

In a situation when liberalism dominated the organiza-

tional line of the Party, it was impossible to realize the

Party's style of work "to combine theory and practice, to

keep close bonds with the masses and to conduct self-

criticism". It was equally impossible to realize the method

of leadership whose essence is the unity of the leadership

and the masses; to realize it the leadership must give an

example to the rank-and-file.

The self-criticism points out that thus, in general the

wrong political line which ruled in the Party was followed

by the wrong line in the organizational field which vio-

lated the principles of a Marxist-Leninist Party, destroyed

the organizational foundation of the party, namely, dem-

ocratic centralism, and trampled on the party’s style of

work and method of leadership.

The self-criticism emphatically points out that to build

the P.K.I. as a Marxist-Leninist Party, we must thor-

oughly uproot liberalism in the organizational field and

its ideological source. The P.K.I. must be rebuilt as a

Lenin-type Party, a Party that will be capable of fulfilling

its role as the advanced detachment and the highest form

of class organization of the Indonesian proletariat, a party

with a historical mission of leading the masses of the In-

donesian people to win victory in the anti-imperialist,

anti-feudal and anti-bureaucrat-capitalist revolution, and

to advance towards socialism. Such a Party must fulfill

the following conditions: Ideologically, it is armed with

the theory of Marxism-Leninism, and free from subjectiv-

ism, opportunism and modern revisionism; politically, it

has a correct programme which includes a revolutionary

agrarian programme, has a thorough understanding of the

problems of the strategy and tactics of the Indonesian rev-

olution, masters the main form of struggle, namely, the

armed struggle of the peasants under the leadership of the

proletariat, as well as other forms of struggle, is capable

of establishing a revolutionary united front of all anti-

imperialist and anti-feudal classes based on the worker-

peasant alliance under the leadership of the working class;

organizationally, it is strong and has a deep root among

the masses of the people, consists of trustworthy, expe-

rienced and steeled Party members who are models in the

implementation of the national tasks.

Today, we are rebuilding our Party under the reign of

counter-revolutionary white terror which is most cruel

and ferocious. The legality of the party and the basic

human rights of the Communists have been wantonly

violated. The Party, therefore, has to be organized and has

to work in complete illegality. While working in complete

illegality, the Party must be adept at utilizing to the full

all possible opportunities to carry out legal activities ac-

cording to circumstances, and to choose ways and means

that are acceptable to the masses with the aim of mobiliz-

ing the masses for struggle and leading this struggle step

by step to a higher stage.

The self-criticism stresses that in rebuilding the P.K.I.

along the Marxist-Leninist line, the greatest attention

should be devoted to the building of Party organizations

in the rural areas, to the establishment of revolutionary

bases.

The task to rebuild a Marxist-Leninist Party as has

been stated above requires arduous and protracted work,

and is full of danger, and consequently it must be carried

out courageously, perseveringly, carefully, patiently and

persistently.

THE WAY OUT

The self-criticism says that once we know the weak-

nesses and mistakes of the Party during the period after

1951 as have been explained above, obviously what we

have to do is to realize the most urgent tasks faced by the

Indonesian Marxist-Leninists at the present time, the first

one being the rebuilding of the P.K.I. as a Marxist-Lenin-

ist Party which is free from subjectivism, opportunism

and modern revisionism.

To rebuild the P.K.I. as such a Marxist-Leninist Party,

Party cadres of all levels and then all Party members

must reach a unanimity of mind with regard to the mis-

takes made by the Party in the past, as well as concerning

the new road that must be taken.

In order to reach unanimity of mind, a rectification

movement must be carried out in the whole party.

Through this rectification movement we will remould the

erroneous ideas of the past into correct ideas. In order to

advance along the new road, it is absolutely necessary to

abandon the wrong road.

Under the present situation, it will not be easy to come

to unanimity of mind concerning all past mistakes down

to the minutest details. But, what is absolutely necessary

is unanimity of mind regarding the fundamental problems

raised in this self-criticism.

The self-criticism says that the opportunist and revi-

sionist mistakes in the political and organizational fields

made by our Party which have been subjected to this crit-

icism were not merely the outcome of the social and

historical conditions during the last decade, but could be

traced farther back in the social and historical conditions

since the founding of our Party. We must, therefore, get

rid of the notion that everything will be all right once

we have made the present criticism and self-criticism. So

long as the ideology of subjectivism is not completely

eradicated from the Party, or worse still, if it is still to be

found among the Party leadership, then our party will

not be able to avoid other mistakes of Right or “Left” op-

portunism because, if such is the case, our Party will not

be able to analyse the political situation correctly, and

consequently will not be able to give correct directives on

work. It is above all the task of the leadership and the

central cadres, and then of the regional leadership and

cadres at all levels to combat subjectivism persistently and

wholeheartedly.

Subjectivism can be effectively combated and liquidated

when the abitity of the whole Party to distinguish pro-

letarian ideology from the ideology of the petty bour-

geoisie is raised, and when criticism and self-criticism is

encouraged. To raise the ability of the whole Party to dis-

tinguish proletarian ideology from the ideology of the

petty bourgeoisie will be possible only by intensifying the

education of Marxism-Leninism. The Party must educate

its members to apply the Marxist-Leninist method in an-

alysing the political situation and in evaluating the forces

of the existing classes, so that subjective analysis and

evaluation can be avoided. The Party must draw the atten-

tion of the members to the importance of investigation

and study of social and economic conditions, in order to

be able to define the tactics of struggle and the corre-

sponding method of work. The Party must help the mem-

bers to understand that without an investigation of the

actual conditions they will get bogged down in phantasy.

The self-criticism emphatically points out that the ex-

perience of the struggle waged by the party in the past

has shown how indispensable it is for the Indonesian

Marxist-Leninists, who are resolved to defend Marxism-

Leninism and to combat modern revisionism, to study not

only the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, but

also to devote special attention to studying the Thought

of Mao Tse-tung who has succeeded in brilliantly inherit-

ing, defending and developing Marxism-Leninism to its

peak in the present era.

The P.K.I. will be able to hold aloft the banner of Marx-

ism-Leninism, only when it takes a resolute stand in the

struggle against modern revisionism which today is cen-

tred around the leading group of the C.P.S.U. The fight

against modern revisionism cannot be consistently carried

out while, at the same time, preserving friendship with

the modern revisionists. The P.K.I. must abandon the

wrong attitude it held in the past with regard to the ques-

tion of the relations with the modern revisionists. Loyalty

to proletarian internationalism can only be manifested by

a merciless stand in the struggle against modern revision-

ism, because modern revisionism has destroyed proleta-

rian internationalism, and betrayed the struggle of the

proletariat and the oppressed people all over the world.

In rebuilding the Party, the Indonesian Marxist-Lenin-

ists must devote their attention to the creation of the

conditions to lead the armed agrarian revolution of the

peasants that will become the main form of struggle to

win victory for the people's democratic revolution in In-

donesia. This means that the greatest attention should

be paid to the rebuilding of Party organizations in the

rural areas. The greatest attention must be paid to the

solution of the problem of arousing, organizing and mo-

bilizing the peasants in an anti-feudal agrarian revolution.

The integration of the Party with the peasants, in partic-

ular with farm labourers and poor peasants, must be con-

scientiously carried out. Because, only through such an

integration, will the Party be able to lead the peasantry,

and the peasantry, for their part, will be capable of be-

coming the invincible bulwark of the people's democratic

revolution.

As a result of the attacks of the third white terror,

Party organizations in the rural areas in general have suf-

fered greater damage. This fact has rendered it more dif-

ficult and arduous to work in the countryside. But this

does not in any way change the inexorable law that the

main force of the people's democratic revolution in In-

donesia is the peasantry, and its base area is the country-

side. With the most resolute determination that everything

is for the masses of the people, the Indonesian Marxist-

Leninists will certainly be able to overcome the gravest

difficulties. '' By having the most wholehearted faith in

the masses and by relying on the masses, the Indonesian

Marxist-Leninists will certainly be able to transform the

backward Indonesian villages into great and consolidated

military, political and cultural bastions of the revolution.

The Indonesian peasants are the most interested in the

people's democratic revolution. Because, only this revo-

lution will liberate them from the life of backwardness

and inequality as a result of feudal suppression. It is only

this revolution that will give them what they have dreamt

all their lives and which will give them life: land. That is

why the peasants will surely take this road of revolution

for land and liberation, no matter how arduous and full

of twists and turns this road will be.

Obviously, the second task of the Indonesian Marxist-

Leninists at present is the creation o the necessary condi-

tions for the armed agrarian revolution of the peasants

under the leadership of the proletariat. Provided that the

Indonesian Marxist-Leninists succeed in arousing, organ-

izing and mobilizing the peasants to carry through an

anti-feudal agrarian revolution, the leadership of the

working class in the people's democratic revolution and

the victory of this revolution are assured.

However, the Party must continue the efforts to es-

tablish a revolutionary united front with other anti-impe-

rialist and anti-feudal classes and groups. Based on the

alliance of the working class and the peasantry under the

leadership of the proletariat, the Party must work to win

over the urban petty bourgeoisie and other democratic

forces, and must also work to win over the national bour-

geoisie as an additional ally in the people's democratic

revolution. The present objective conditions offer the

possibility for the establishment of a broad revolutionary

united front.

The military dictatorship of the Right-wing army gen-

erals Nasution and Suharto is the manifestation of the

rule by the most reactionary classes in the country, namely,

the comprador-bourgeoisie, the bureaucrat-capital-

ists and the landlords. The internal reactionary classes

under the leadership of the clique of Right-wing army

generals exercise dictatorship over the Indonesian people,

and act as watch-dogs guarding the interests of imperial-

ism, in particular United States imperialism, in Indonesia.

Consequently, the coming into power of the military dic-

tatorship of the Right-wing army generals will certainly

serve to intensify the suppression and exploitation of the

Indonesian people by imperialism and feudalism.

The military dictatorship of the Right-wing army gen-

erals represents the interests of only a very small minor-

ity who suppresses the overwhelming majority of the

Indonesian people. That is why the military dictatorship

of the Right-wing army generals will certainly meet with

resistance from the broad masses of the people.

Thus, the third urgent task faced by the Indonesian

Marxist-Leninists is to establish the revolutionary united

front with all anti-imperialist and anti-feudal classes and

groups based on the worker-peasant alliance under the

leadership of the working class.

Thus, it has becorne clear that to win victory for the

people's democratic revolution, the Indonesian Marxist-

Leninists must hold aloft the Three Banners of the Party,

namely:

The first banner, the building of a Marxist-Leninist

Party which is free from subjectivism, opportunism and

modern revisionism.

The second banner, the armed people's struggle which

in essence is the armed struggle of the peasants in an anti-

feudal agrarian revolution under the leadership of the

working class.

The third banner, the revolutionary united front based

on the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of

the working class.

The tasks faced by the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists

are very arduous. They have to work under the most

savage and barbarous terror and persecution which have

no parallel in history. However, the Indonesian Marxist-

Leninists do not have the slightest doubt that, by correct-

ing the mistakes made by the Party in the past, they are

now marching along the correct road, the road of people's

democratic revolution. No matter how protracted, tor-

turous and full of difficulties, this is the only road leading

to a free and democratic New Indonesia, an Indonesia that

will really belong to the Indonesian people. For this noble

cause, we must have the courage to traverse the long road.

The self-criticism points out that the Indonesian Marx-

ist-Leninists and revolutionaries on the basis of their own

experience in struggle, do not have the slightest doubt

about the correctness of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's thesis

that "the imperialists and all reactionaries are paper

tigers. In appearance they are terrifying, but in reality

they are not so powerful. From a long-term point of

view, it is not the reactionaries but the people who are

really powerful". The military dictatorship of the Right

-wing army generals which is now in power is also a paper

tiger. In appearance they are powerful and terrifying.

But in reality they are not so powerful, because they are

not supported but on the contrary are opposed by the peo-

ple, because their ranks are beset by contradictions, and

because they are quarrelling among themselves for a big-

ger share of their plunder and for greater power. The

imperialists, in particular the United States imperialists

who are the mainstay of the military dictatorship of the

Right-wing army generals, are also paper tigers. In ap-

pearance they are powerful and terrifying, but in reality

they are weak and nearing their complete downfall. The

weakness of imperialism, in particular United States

imperialism, is vividly demonstrated by their inability to

conquer the heroic Vietnamese people and to check the

tide of the anti-imperialist struggle waged by the people

all over the world, including the American people them-

selves, who are furiously dealing blows at the fortresses

of imperialism.

From a strategic point of view, the imperialists and all

reactionaries are weak, and consequently we must despise

them. By despising the enemies strategically we can build

up the courage to fight them and the confidence to defeat

them. At the same time we must take them all seriously,

take into full account of their strength tactically, and re-

frain from taking adventurist steps against them.

The self-criticism says that today, we are in an era

when imperialism is undergoing its total collapse, and so-

cialism is marching forward triumphantly all over the

world. No force on earth can prevent the total downfall

of imperialism and all other reactionaries, and no force

can block the victory of Socialism throughout the world.

The military dictatorship of the Right-wing army gen-

erals, as the watch-dog guarding the interests of impe-

rialism in Indonesia, is also unable to avert its destruction.

The vicious and savage massacre and torture against the

hundreds of thousands of Communists and democrats

which they are still continuing today, will not be able to

prevent the people and the Communists from rising up

in resistance. On the contrary, all the brutalities and

cruelties will only serve to intensify the tit-for-tat resist-

ance struggle of the people. The Communists will avenge

the death of their hundreds of thousands of comrades

with the resolve to serve still better the people, the revolu-

tion and the Party.

The Indonesian Marxist-Leninists will spare neither

efforts nor energy to fulfill the best wishes of the world

Marxist-Leninists by resolutely defending Marxism-

Leninism and struggling against modern revisionism, by

working still better for the liberation of their people and

country, and for the world proletarian revolution.

The Indonesian Marxist-Leninists who are united in

mind and determined to take the road of revolution, by

putting their wholehearted faith in the people, by relying

on the people, by working courageously, perseveringly,

conscientiously, patiently, persistently and vigilantly, will

surely be able to accomplish their historical mission, to

lead the people's democratic revolution, to smash the mili-

tary dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals and to

set up a completely new power, the people's democratic

dictatorship. With the people's democratic dictatorship,

the joint power of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal classes

and groups under the leadership of the working class, the

Indonesian people will completely liquidate imperialism

and the vestiges of feudalism, build a free and democratic

new society, and advance towards Socialism where the

suppression and exploitation of man by man no longer

exists.

Let us unite closely to take the road of revolution which

is illuminated by the teaching of Marxism-Leninism, the

road leading to the liberation of the Indonesian people

and proletariat, the road leading to Socialism.

(bold face emphases and quotation marks are in the original)